This is expected to be a “hot”, but in many ways foreseeable, August in Greek-Turkish relations.

Greece now has experience and an enhanced plan of deterrence.

Ankara’s decision to send its new Abdulhamid  Han drill ship (its fourth) into the Eastern Mediterranean, from 9 August onwards, is clearly part of its “risk and provocations” strategy.

There are various scenarios about where Turkey will deploy the drill ship, but what is certain is that Ankara’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine (which claims that large parts of the EEZs of Greece and Cyprus are Turkish) and Turkish Preident Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s continuous provocations, lie at the heart of Ankara’ planned moves.

Greece will deal with the forthcoming “hot days” with a series of comparative advantages.

Germany’s stern message to Turkey, which triggered the consternation of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, is one of them.

Most importantly, however, Greece has taken solid steps since 2019 to strengthen its strategic alliances in the broader region.

All along, Athens has wisely and prudently reminded everyone that as a NATO and EU member-state it remains a secure pole of the West in the region, that it has perfectly clear red lines, and that it is determined to defend its national sovereignty in its entirety.

Hence, Turkey will seriously consider the new realities in plotting the course of its drill ship.

It will also take into account that Greece and the West constitute a stable front in confronting the game of revisionism, with composure and without high-pitched rhetoric.